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Non-State Armed Groups, Detention Authority in Non-International Armed Conflict, and 
the Coherence of International Law: Searching for a Way Forward 
Abstract 
International humanitarian law establishes explicit safeguards applicable to detention occurring in 
non-international armed conflict. However, debate exists as to whether these treaty provisions 
establish an implicit legal basis for detention. This article approaches this debate in light of the 
application of international humanitarian law to non-State armed groups. It examines the principal 
arguments against implicit detention authority and then applies the law of treaty interpretation to 
international humanitarian law’s detention-related provisions. On the basis of current 
understandings of international law – and the prohibition of arbitrary detention in particular – it is 
concluded that international humanitarian law must be interpreted as establishing implicit detention 
authority, in order to ensure the continued regulation of armed groups. Although perhaps problematic 
from certain States’ perspective this conclusion is reflective of the current state of international law. 
However, this is not necessarily the end of the story. A number of potential ‘ways forward’ are 
identified: implicit detention authority may be (a) rejected, (b) accepted, or (c) re-examined in light of 
the non-State status of armed groups, and what this means for the content of the prohibition of 
arbitrary detention. These scenarios are examined in light of the desire to ensure: the coherency of 
international law including recognition of the role of armed groups, the continued effectiveness of 
international humanitarian law, and State sovereignty. An emphasis is placed on understanding the 
non-State status of armed groups and what this means for international regulation and the content of 
imposed obligations. 
Keywords: armed groups, detention, non-international armed conflict, human rights, 
treaty interpretation 
1. Introduction 
 
International humanitarian law establishes explicit safeguards applicable to detention 
occurring in non-international armed conflict. These obligations are codified in article 3 
common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and article 5 of Additional Protocol II,1 and 
they apply equally to States and to non-State armed groups.2  However, debate exists as to 
whether international humanitarian law establishes an implicit legal basis for detention.3 
Specifically, by regulating detention when it occurs, do these treaty rules necessarily provide 
legal authorisation for that detention?  
 
It is essential that this question be resolved in order to ensure clarity regarding the 
application of international humanitarian law. If the law is to be effective, both States and 
non-State armed groups must know its contents. Specifically, they must know whether they 
can conduct detention operations. Although this issue is clearly of concern to States,4 it is 
particularly important in relation to armed groups. As discussed below, if all detention by 
armed groups constitutes arbitrary detention, then all instances of detention by armed 
groups are straightforwardly illegal.5 This may have immediate implications in relation to 
armed groups’ treatment of individuals. For example, if all detention is illegal, will this 
increase the likelihood that armed groups will execute rather than release individuals whom 
																																								 																				
1 See, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 
21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287, article 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 
1978) 1125 UNTS 609, article 5. 
2 Common article 3 explicitly binds ‘each Party to the conflict’, while Additional Protocol II ‘develops and supplements’ 
common Article 3. See, Article I, Additional Protocol II. 
3 The legal basis for detention is considered to be distinct from the regulation of detention itself, and issues such as the grounds 
for detention, the legal review of detention, and so on. 
4 Regarding the importance of this issue to States, see generally, Serdar Mohammed & Others v. Secretary of State for Defence, Court 
of Appeal, Case Nos. A2/2014/1862; A2/2014/4084; A2/2014/4086, 30 July 2015. 
5 See Sections 1.B and 5. This is not the case in relation to States who can, for example, establish detention authority by means of 
domestic legislation. 
they would otherwise detain? It also gives rise to broader concerns regarding the 
effectiveness of international humanitarian law: if the law prohibits activity central to the 
conduct of armed conflict, armed groups’ incentive to respect the law as a whole may be 
reduced.  
 
This is not an academic issue. Detention by armed groups is a routine activity in armed 
conflict, and often one of the first activities that an armed group engages in.6 For instance, 
armed groups have established detention operations in Cote d’Ivoire,7 Mali,8 Libya,9 and Sri 
Lanka.10 Indeed, the Islamic State, which exerts control over six million people in Iraq and 
Syria, has established both a police force and a hierarchical court system.11  
 
A significant school of thought argues that international humanitarian law is silent with 
respect to the legal basis for detention: although detention is regulated, it is not authorised, 
even implicitly.12 Accordingly, the required legal basis must be established elsewhere, either 
in domestic law or, exceptionally, in other branches of international law, such as on the basis 
of a Chapter VII Resolution of the UN Security Council.13 The arguments in support of this 
																																								 																				
6 Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War (Cornell University Press 2011) 63. 
Other examples include the CPN-M in Nepal, the SPLA in Sudan, and FARC and ELN in Colombia. See David Tuck, 'Detention 
by armed groups: overcoming challenges to humanitarian action' (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross, 761. 
7 David Tuck, 'Detention by armed groups: overcoming challenges to humanitarian action' (2011) 93 International Review of 
the Red Cross, 762. 
8 See, 'Mali: New Abuses by Tuareg Rebels, Soldiers', Human Rights Watch (7 June 2013); ‘Mali: ICRC visits detainees in the 
north’, News Release, International Committee of the Red Cross (31 July2012). 
9 Human Rights Watch, 'Letter to Misrata Councils', 8 April 2012, 1. 
10 International Crisis Group, ‘Sri Lanka's Return to War: Limiting the Damage’ (2008) 13. 
11 Richard Barrett, 'The Islamic State', The Soufan Group, November 2014, 8, 35. 
12 Els Debuf, Captured in War: Lawful Internment in Armed Conflict (Hart 2013); Gabor Rona, ‘Is There a Way Out of the Non-
International Armed Conflict Detention Dilemma?’ (2015) 91 International Law Studies, pp.35-7; Ryan Goodman, 
‘Authorization versus Regulation of Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (2015) 91 International Law Studies, pp. 
158-60. 
13 This was the argument accepted by the UK High Court and Court of Appeal in Serdar Mohammed. See, Serdar Mohammed v. 
Ministry of Defence, High Court of Justice, Case No. HQ12X03367, 2 May 2014, paras. 6(i) and (iv); Serdar Mohammed & Others v. 
Secretary of State for Defence, Court of Appeal, Case Nos. A2/2014/1862; A2/2014/4084; A2/2014/4086, 30 July 2015, para. 125. See 
also, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne & Dapo Akande, 'Does IHL provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed 
conclusion relate, inter alia, to the proposal that international regulation does not constitute 
affirmative authorisation (based on the Lotus principle), that international law can (and 
does) regulate potentially illegal situations without legitimising those situations, and that 
the absence of specified grounds and procedures indicate that States did not intend to 
establish a legal basis for detention. Sections 2-4 examine these arguments, taking particular 
note of their application to armed groups where appropriate. It is concluded that these 
arguments either do not apply to armed groups, fail to take into consideration the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention, or do not pose an obstacle to the existence of implicit 
detention authority. 
 
Section 5 then examines common article 3 and article 5 Additional Protocol II in light of the 
international law of treaty interpretation. Two factors are significant in this regard. First is 
the fact that no possibility exists for armed groups to independently establish a legal basis 
for detention outside international humanitarian law. This factor distinguishes armed 
groups from States who can, for example, establish a legal basis by means of domestic 
legislation. Second is the international human rights law prohibition of arbitrary detention 
which holds that in order to be lawful all detention must have an established legal basis. 
Accordingly, if international humanitarian law does not establish an implicit legal basis for 
detention, then all detention by armed groups is illegal, and so armed groups cannot detain. 
However, to conclude that no implicit authorisation exists frustrates the object and purpose 
of international humanitarian law’s detention-related provisions, namely the regulation of 
detention by States and non-State armed groups, and indicates that States have undertaken 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
Conflicts?', EJIL:Talk!, 7 May 2014. Available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-
international-armed-conflicts/. 
an exercise in futility: the prohibition of arbitrary detention is absolute, and States cannot 
regulate activity that is absolutely prohibited. In this light, the law of treaty interpretation 
requires that international humanitarian law be interpreted as establishing an implicit legal 
basis for detention. 
 
Although this conclusion is reflective of the current state of international law, it is not 
necessarily the end of the story. Section 6 examines three possible ‘ways forward’: the 
existence of implied detention authority on the basis of the argument presented in Section 5 
may be (a) rejected, (b) accepted, or (c) re-examined in light of the non-State status of armed 
groups. These scenarios are discussed in light of: the coherence of international law as a 
legal system, including its ability to effectively incorporate the regulation of non-State armed 
groups; the effectiveness of international humanitarian law; and States’ interests, including 
concerns related to sovereignty and the desire to prosecute insurgent activity. In light of the 
non-State status of armed groups it is suggested that although armed groups necessarily 
remain bound by the prohibition of arbitrary detention, the content of this prohibition may 
be interpreted primarily in light of its underpinning factors, such as predictability, justice, 
appropriateness, and so on, and not on the existence of a legal basis.   
 
Before proceeding further, two preliminary issues must be addressed. First, the application 
of international humanitarian law to non-State armed groups must be confirmed, as it is this 
application that underpins the argument presented herein. Second, the law relating to the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention must be addressed: if the prohibition of arbitrary 
detention is not applicable, then the establishment of a legal basis for detention by non-State 
armed groups is not necessary. 
 A. The application of international humanitarian law to non-State armed groups 
 
Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and article 5 of Additional 
Protocol II regulate detention during non-international armed conflict. It is clear, both from a 
plain text reading of the respective treaty provisions, and in light of States’ discussions at 
Geneva, that these provisions were intended to apply equally to States and to non-State 
armed groups.14 Common article 3 clearly states that: ‘[i]n the case of armed conflict not of 
an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, 
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions…’.15 
As noted by Moir, this provision ‘was obviously intended to create duties and rights for 
both States and insurgents.’16 Although the phrase ‘each Party to the conflict’ was 
deliberately omitted from the text of Additional Protocol II, article 1 thereof states that the 
Protocol ‘develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application’. Accordingly, as 
Cassese notes: 
 
the conclusion is inescapable that Protocol II was destined by its authors to 
operate for rebels. It would indeed be absurd to contend that Article 3 gives 
																																								 																				
14 See further, Daragh Murray, ‘How International Humanitarian Law Treaties Bind Non-State Armed Groups’ (2015) 20 
Journal of Conflict & Security Law 1. 
15 Emphasis added. 
16 Lindsay Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (CUP 2002) 53. See also, G.I.A.D. Draper, The Red Cross Conventions (Stevens 
& Sons 1958) 13. 
rights and imposes obligations on rebels, while Protocol II – which is but an 
elaboration of that article – refuses to make itself available to them.17 
 
This conclusion is reinforced by reference to the drafting process. States engaged in 
extensive discussion in relation to the application of both common article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II to armed groups.18 Indeed, the equal application of Additional Protocol II to 
States and armed groups was stated to be a ‘sovereign principle’.19 Capacity and compliance 
issues arising consequent to the application to armed groups of the detention-related 
provisions in Article 5 Additional Protocol II were also explicitly addressed.20  
 
B. The prohibition of arbitrary detention 
 
The prohibition of arbitrary detention established under international human rights law is 
absolute.21 Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that:  
 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subject 
to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except 
																																								 																				
17 Antonio Cassese, ‘The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (1981) 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 424. 
18 See the statements of the UK, Norway and Spain, Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Volume II Section 
B, 10-11; and the statements of Syria, Iraq and France, CDDH/I/SR.40, Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Geneva 1974-77) Volume VIII, at 
paras. 4, 29 and 34 respectively. 
19 Argentina, CDDH/SR.49, Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Geneva 1974-77) Volume VII, 76. 
20 See generally the discussion on draft Article 8 of Additional Protocol II in CDDH/I/SR.32 and CDDH/I/SR.33, Official Records 
of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts 
(Geneva 1974-77) Volume VIII. 
21 The continued application of international human rights law during armed conflict is now well accepted. See, Case Concerning 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) Judgment, International Court of Justice, 
19 December 2005, para. 216. 
on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by 
law.22  
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross’ study on customary international 
humanitarian law concluded that the prohibition of arbitrary detention was a norm of 
customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed 
conflict.23 Similarly, in General Comment No. 29, the Human Rights Committee stated that 
the prohibition of arbitrary detention constitutes a peremptory norm of international law 
that cannot be subject to derogation.24 Indeed, the prohibition of arbitrary detention has been 
referred to as a ‘universal rule’ of international human rights law, ‘underpinning the 
regimes regulating detention in each of the key treaties’.25 
 
Although a number of factors are relevant when determining whether a particular instance 
of detention violates the prohibition of arbitrary detention,26 a key consideration is whether a 
legal basis for that detention exists. All the major human rights law treaties ‘provide that no 
one shall be deprived of his liberty except on grounds and in accordance with a procedure that are 
established by law’,27 and the Human Rights Committee has confirmed that arrest or detention 
																																								 																				
22 This requirement is reflected in Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 7 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and Article 14 of the Arab 
Charter on Human Rights.  
23 Rule 99, Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume 1: Rules 
(International Committee of the Red Cross, CUP 2005). 
24 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, 'States of Emergency (article 4)', UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 
(2001), para. 11. 
25 Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict (OUP 2016). The prohibition of arbitrary detention 
under international human rights law did not necessarily enjoy this statue at the time common Article 3 was adopted. 
However, the prohibition of arbitrary detention was confirmed in Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which was adopted prior to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and was clearly established prior to the adoption of Additional 
Protocol II, which ‘develops and supplements’ common Article 3. Additional issues relating to treaty interpretation are 
discussed further in Daragh Murray, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups (Hart 2016) pp. 164-166. 
26 See, Saadi v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 13229/03, 29 January 2008, 
paras. 67-74. 
27 Louise Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism (OUP 2011) 255. Emphasis added. 
that lacks any legal basis is arbitrary.28 Accordingly, in order to be lawful, any instance of 
detention occurring in non-international armed conflict – whether by a State or a non-State 
armed group – must have a legal basis. This legal authority to detain can be established by 
the international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflict, under 
domestic law, or on the basis of another source of international law, such as a UN Security 
Council Resolution.29 
 
For States, the establishment of a domestic law basis for detention is relatively 
straightforward and can be achieved through an act of legislation. Additionally, albeit under 
more exceptional circumstances, a legal basis may be established under international law, 
for instance, consequent to a Chapter VII Resolution of the UN Security Council.30 However, 
these potential sources of legal authority simply do not exist for non-State armed groups. It 
is exceptionally unlikely – if not an absolute impossibility – that a legal basis for detention 
by an armed group will exist under domestic law.31 Indeed, armed group detention is 
typically regarded as a form of unlawful confinement subject to criminal sanction.32 It is 
equally unlikely that armed group detention will be authorised by the UN Security Council. 
While such authorisation is perhaps foreseeable in relation to certain non-State entities, such 
																																								 																				
28 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 3, ‘Article 9 (Liberty and security of person)’, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35, 16 
December 2014, para. 11. See also, A and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, European Court of Human Rights, Application 
No. 3455/05, 19 February 2009, para. 164. 
29 See, Articles 39 and 103, UN Charter.  
30 Gabor Rona, ‘Is There a Way Out of the Non-International Armed Conflict Detention Dilemma?’ (2015) 91 International Law 
Studies, 44. Some suggest that an implicit legal basis for detention is contained in the mandate to take ‘all necessary measures’. 
See the argument of the United Kingdom in Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, European Court of Human Rights, 
Application No. 27021/08, 7 July 2011, para. 88. 
31 Gabor Rona, ‘Is There a Way Out of the Non-International Armed Conflict Detention Dilemma?’ (2015) 91 International Law 
Studies, 38. 
32 In relation to Canadian criminal law see Section 279(2), Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, see the offence of false 
imprisonment under the common law in England and Wales. See further, Els Debuf, Captured in War: Lawful Internment in 
Armed Conflict (Hart 2013) 460, 462.   
as a UN peacekeeping operation, given armed groups active opposition to States, 
authorisation by the Security Council is an exceedingly remote possibility.33 
 
It may be argued that armed groups – as non-State actors – are not bound by international 
human rights law and so the prohibition of arbitrary detention simply does not apply. This 
argument is not endorsed.34 However, irrespective of the direct application of international 
human rights law to armed groups it is unequivocal that States are directly bound by 
international human rights law. The obligation to protect establishes that States must protect 
individuals against third party violations of international human rights law,35 requiring that 
States protect against arbitrary detention by non-State armed groups. The prohibition of 
arbitrary detention therefore prevents States from intentionally creating international treaty 
law allowing arbitrary detention by non-State armed groups. While States may potentially 
allow or regulate detention by non-state actors, that regulation must comply with the 
requirements of international human rights law, and must therefore include a legal basis.36 
Detention cannot be arbitrary. 
 
The principal arguments against the existence of an implicit legal basis for detention will 
now be addressed. The first and second of these arguments are closely related. The first 
argument (in section 2) addresses the Lotus principle, and the proposition that States can 
regulate activity without establishing an associated legal basis, as States are free to act as 
																																								 																				
33 Even if a legal basis for armed group detention is established consequent to a Chapter VII UN Resolution, such authority will 
necessarily be sporadic and restricted in its applicability. As such, it fails to satisfy the difficulties addressed in Section 5 below. 
34 See further, Daragh Murray, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups (Hart 2016). 
35 See generally, Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, Decision, African 
Commission on Human Rights, Communication No. 155/96, 27 October 2001, para. 57; Osman v. United Kingdom, Judgment, 
European Court of Human Rights, App. No. 87/1997/871/1083, 28 October 1998, para. 115. 
36 International human rights law requires that there be a legal basis for detention, irrespective of who actually conducts the 
detention. This is evident from a plain text reading of the relevant treaty law, see for instance, Article 9(1) International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
they choose, provided the conduct in question is not prohibited by international law.37 The 
second argument (in section 3) addresses a related but distinct point, namely that States can 
– and do – regulate potentially illegal situations, and that this regulation does not necessitate 
an underlying legal basis.38 The third argument examines the proposition that implicit 
detention authority cannot be presumed, given the absence of grounds and procedures for 
detention. 
 
2. The argument that regulation of activity does not constitute affirmative authorisation 
 
It is argued that the international regulation of an activity does not automatically constitute 
affirmative authorisation for that activity:39 the fact that States create international 
humanitarian law to regulate detention does not imply authorization for that detention. A 
basis for this argument may be derived from the principle that international law grants 
States freedom of action on the international plane, and so States are free to engage in any 
conduct not expressly prohibited by international law. This principle was expressed by the 
Permanent Court of Justice in The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey):  
 
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of 
law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as 
																																								 																				
37 This argument focuses on the fact of regulation. 
38 This argument focuses on the regulation of illegal situations. 
39 See, Derek Jinks, ‘International Human Rights Law in Time of Armed Conflict’ in Andrew Clapham & Paola Gaeta (eds.) The 
Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP  2014) pp. 666-9; Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne & Dapo Akande, 'Does 
IHL provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts?', EJIL:Talk!, 7 May 2014. Available at: 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-international-armed-conflicts/. It is highlighted that 
these authors do not explicitly refer to the Lotus principle, and that some of the arguments addressed therein are also relevant 
in the context of section 3 below.  
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing 
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between 
these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement 
of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be 
presumed.40 
 
Accordingly, the Lotus Principle holds that States are awarded ‘a wide measure of discretion 
which is only limited in certain areas by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State 
remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable’.41 This 
principle was upheld by the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence In Respect of 
Kosovo,42 and is a corollary of States’ sovereignty and independence. As stated in the 
Separate Opinion of Judge Anzilotti in Customs Regime between Germany and Austria (Protocol 
of March 19th, 1931):  
 
Independence as thus understood is really no more than the normal condition 
of States according to international law; it may also be described as sovereignty 
(suprema potestas), or external sovereignty, by which is meant that the State has 
over it no other authority than that of international law.43  
 
																																								 																				
40 The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), Judgment, Permanent Court of International Justice, Judgment No. 9, 7 September 
1927, para. 44. Emphasis added. 
41 The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), Judgment, Permanent Court of International Justice, Judgment No. 9, 7 September 
1927, para. 46. 
42 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 
International Court of Justice, 22 July 2010, para. 56. 
43 Customs Regime between Germany and Austria (Protocol of March 19th, 1931), Separate Opinion of Judge Anzilotti, Permanent 
Court of International Justice, 5 September 1931, para. 81. Emphasis added. 
The Lotus-based argument holds that, as a broad legal authority exists under international 
law, States can establish rules to regulate conduct without establishing a specific legal basis 
for that conduct: States are free to act as they choose, provided that the conduct in question 
is not expressly prohibited by international law.44 However, arbitrary detention is expressly 
prohibited,45 and this prohibition is recognised as forming part of customary international 
law.46 The Lotus principle cannot, therefore, apply to detention in non-international armed 
conflict, and States do not enjoy freedom of action in this regard. As all detention-related 
activity must be consistent with the prohibition of arbitrary detention, a legal basis is 
therefore required.47 For armed groups party to a non-international armed conflict, 
international humanitarian law provides the only possible source of this legal basis.48 
  
3. The argument that international law regulates potentially illegal situations without 
establishing legal authority for those situations 
 
A second, related, argument against the establishment of an implicit legal basis for detention 
in non-international armed conflicts holds that international law can, and does, regulate 
potentially illegal situations without providing legal authorisation for those situations.49 
Two examples may be provided in this regard. The first is the distinction between the jus ad 
bellum and the jus in bello, and the fact that the jus in bello applies irrespective of any legal 
																																								 																				
44 The UK Court of Appeal questioned the continuing legitimacy of the Lotus principle. Serdar Mohammed & Others v. Secretary 
of State for Defence, Court of Appeal, Case Nos. A2/2014/1862; A2/2014/4084; A2/2014/4086, 30 July 2015, para. 197. 
45 See above Section B.  
46 See, for example, Rule 99, Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume 
1: Rules (International Committee of the Red Cross, CUP 2005). 
47 The Serdar Mohammed case centred upon the identification of this legal basis. 
48 See above fns, 30-33, and accompanying text. 
49 Els Debuf, Captured in War: Lawful Internment in Armed Conflict (Hart 2013) 468. 
authorisation established under the jus ad bellum. The second is that the International Court 
of Justice has held that international law may regulate State activity – in this case the phased 
withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the DRC – without providing legal authorisation for 
that activity.50 Accordingly, this argument holds that international humanitarian law can 
regulate detention, even if the detention itself is unlawful, and so international humanitarian 
law provisions regulating detention cannot be considered as implying a legal basis for that 
detention. 
 
It is submitted that the jus ad bellum / jus in bello argument does not apply in a 
straightforward manner to the situation at hand.  Within international law there is a clear 
distinction between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. The jus ad bellum regulates the inter-
State resort to force, while the jus in bello regulates armed conflict itself.51 These are two 
distinct bodies of law and it is accepted that the jus in bello applies irrespective of the legality 
or illegality of the conflict under the jus ad bellum.52 This distinction is possible because 
international law does not absolutely prohibit all instances armed conflict. Although article 
2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits ‘the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state’,53 this prohibition is subject to two notable exceptions: 
the use of force is permissible in the exercise of individual or collective self-defence,54 or if 
authorised by a Chapter VII Resolution of the UN Security Council in the interests of 
																																								 																				
50 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 
International Court of Justice, 19 December2005, paras. 92-105. See, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne & Dapo Akande, 'Does IHL 
provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts?', EJIL:Talk!, 7 May 2014. Available at: 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-international-armed-conflicts/.  
51 Further discussion relating to the jus ad bellum, the jus in bello, and the relationship between the two is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
52 See, preamble, paragraph 5, Additional Protocol II; article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949; Derek Jinks, 
‘International Human Rights Law in Time of Armed Conflict’ in Andrew Clapham & Paola Gaeta (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP  2014) p. 668. 
53 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, article 2(4). 
54 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, article 51. 
international peace and security.55 These exceptions mean that it is possible – and indeed 
desirable – to establish a clear distinction between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello and to 
regulate armed conflict irrespective of the legality of the initial use of force. However, this is 
not the case in relation to detention, as all instances of detention must be consistent with the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention. 
 
It is noted that, in the absence of exceptions to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter – i.e. if armed 
conflict was absolutely prohibited – the regulation of armed conflict would be 
impermissible: international law cannot regulate activity that is subject to an absolute 
prohibition. For example, instances of torture cannot be regulated as torture is subject to an 
absolute prohibition.56 The same is true with respect to armed group detention in non-
international armed conflict: the absolute prohibition of arbitrary detention precludes the 
possibility of regulating arbitrary detention.57 
 
A related argument notes that in the Armed Activities case the International Court of Justice 
rejected the view that treaties regulating the withdrawal of Ugandan armed forces from the 
DRC constituted consent to those forces being present in the DRC – ‘in the sense of 
validating that presence in law’58 – including during the withdrawal phase.59 As the presence 
of foreign troops on the territory of a State absent the territorial State’s consent prima facie 
																																								 																				
55 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, article 42. 
56 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-95-
17/1-T, 10 December 1998, para. 155. 
57 See section 1.B above. 
58 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 
International Court of Justice, 19 December2005, para. 105. 
59 Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne & Dapo Akande, 'Does IHL provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts?', EJIL:Talk!, 7 May 2014. Available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-
international-armed-conflicts/. 
constitutes a violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity,60 this decision appears to 
support the argument that international law can regulate a potentially illegal situation 
without authorising that situation.61  
 
However, in the Armed Activities case the Court was dealing with a situation markedly 
different to that of detention in non-international armed conflict. The agreements 
underpinning the Ugandan withdrawal were intended to ensure ‘an eventual peace, with 
security for all concerned’.62 In this regard the agreements regulated the withdrawal of 
Ugandan troops in order to secure a return to a situation in conformity with international 
law through restoration of the status quo ante.63 This situation is distinct from the issue of 
detention in non-international armed conflict. Indeed, applying the Armed Activities 
argument to armed group detention would suggest that international humanitarian law 
should secure the release of detainees thereby restoring the situation to one in conformity 
with international law. It should not establish safeguards regulating continued detention 
thereby facilitating the perpetuation of an illegal situation.  
 
Significant to this conclusion is the International Court of Justice’s finding in relation to the 
Luanda agreement. This agreement held that, as part of the overall withdrawal, ‘Ugandan 
troops shall remain on the slopes of Mt. Ruwenzori [in the DRC] until the Parties put in 
place security mechanisms guaranteeing Uganda’s security’.64 This agreement was not 
																																								 																				
60 See, Articles 2(1) and 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
61 The use of force and infringements on territorial integrity are not subject to an absolute prohibition. See, Articles 42 and 51, 
UN Charter. 
62 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 
International Court of Justice, 19 December2005, para. 99. 
63 An illegal situation was regulated in order to secure a return to a situation in compliance with international law. 
64 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 
International Court of Justice, 19 December2005, para. 103. 
intended to secure a return to the status quo ante but was intended to regulate Uganda’s 
continued – albeit limited – presence in the DRC. Absent a legal basis, this presence would 
violate the international law requirements relating to territorial integrity. Significantly, the 
International Court of Justice held that, unlike the other agreements discussed, the Luanda 
agreement did in fact constitute authorisation for Uganda’s continued presence in the 
DRC.65 
  
On the basis of the above, it is submitted that the two principal arguments in support of the 
proposition that regulation of a (potentially illegal) situation does not imply authorisation of 
that situation are not applicable to the issue of detention in non-international armed conflict. 
 
4. The argument that the absence of grounds and procedures for detention precludes an 
implicit basis for detention 
 
A final argument suggests that the absence of clearly specified grounds and procedures for 
detention in non-international armed conflict precludes an interpretation that international 
humanitarian law contains an implicit authority to detain. As stated by Debuf, ‘for an 
implicit legal basis to detain or intern to exist […] it should at least be possible to deduce 
from it the grounds and procedures in accordance with which a person can be deprived of 
his or her liberty.’66 This argument was also advanced by the High Court in Serdar 
Mohammed: 
 
																																								 																				
65 Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence, High Court of Justice, Case No. HQ12X03367, 2 May 2014, para. 105. 
66 Els Debuf, Captured in War: Lawful Internment in Armed Conflict (2013 Hart Publishing) 466. 
I do not see how CA3 or AP2 could possibly have been intended to provide a 
power to detain, nor how they could reasonably be interpreted as doing so, 
unless it was possible to identify the scope of the power. However, neither CA3 
nor AP2 specifies who may be detained, on what grounds, in accordance with 
what procedures, or for how long.67 
 
However, the absence of detail is not uncommon in international law. Aughey & Sari note 
that: ‘just because the law of armed conflict does not regulate the exercise of a particular 
power in great detail does not mean that it does not recognise the existence of that power at 
all.’68 The example given is civilians’ loss of protection from direct attack ‘for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities.’69 This is a provision of significant importance – it is 
quite literally a matter of life and death – but no further guidance is provided as to what 
constitutes direct participation in hostilities. Indeed, this is an issue that continues to give 
rise to significant – often heated – debate.70 Yet, despite the lack of clearly specified grounds 
regulating the loss of protection from direct attack, this principle continues to be applied, 
and indeed constitutes a fundamental component of the law of armed conflict. 
 
																																								 																				
67Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence, High Court of Justice, Case No. HQ12X03367, 2 May 2014, para. 246; Serdar Mohammed 
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68 Sean Aughey and Aurel Sari, 'Targeting and Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict: Serdar Mohammed and the 
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69 Sean Aughey and Aurel Sari, 'Targeting and Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict: Serdar Mohammed and the 
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70 See, Nils Melzer, ‘Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law’ (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009); Michael Schmitt, ‘The Interpretive Guidance on the 
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The definition of non-international armed conflict is another example on point. Common 
article 3 simply refers to ‘the case of armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties’. No further guidance is 
provided as to what constitutes non-international armed conflict, despite the fact that such 
information is essential in order to determine when a situation transitions from internal 
disturbance to armed conflict, thereby giving rise to the application of the law of armed 
conflict.71 It was only in the Tadic case, 46 years after the codification of the Geneva 
Conventions, that the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia held that non-international armed conflict is ‘protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups 
within a State’.72 Indicators relevant to the organisation and intensity criteria associated with 
the non-international armed conflict threshold were developed in subsequent case law.73  
 
It is concluded that international humanitarian law can establish an implicit legal authority 
to detain absent explicitly specified grounds and procedures. Although beyond the scope of 
this paper, it is suggested that the applicable grounds and procedures can be determined by 
reference to existing international law and the object and purpose of international 
humanitarian law.74 
 
																																								 																				
71 This has significant implications. For example, it indicates the transition from a use of force model based on international 
human rights law, to authorisation of the use of direct lethal force against individuals directly participating in hostilities (under 
appropriate circumstances). 
72 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-94-1, 2 October 1995, para. 70. 
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detention in non-international armed conflict generally, see Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, Detention in Non-International Armed 
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5. Applying the law of treaty interpretation to international humanitarian law’s 
detention-related provisions in light of their application to non-State armed groups 
 
Having discussed the principal arguments against the existence of an implicit legal authority 
to detain, the detention-related provisions of international humanitarian law must now be 
examined in light of the international law of treaty interpretation, in order to determine 
whether implied detention authority does in fact exist. The international law of treaty 
interpretation requires that a treaty be interpreted in a manner capable of ensuring its 
intended effect.75 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes 
that ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.76 
This requirement is recognised as forming part of customary international law.77 Applying 
this rule of interpretation is intended to ensure satisfaction of the principle of effectiveness 
(ut res magis valeat quam pereat),78 which holds that ‘a treaty must be given an interpretation 
that enables its provisions to be “effective and useful”, that is, to have an appropriate 
effect.’79 As such, ‘[w]hen a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the 
other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and 
purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be adopted.’80 
 
																																								 																				
75 See, eg Hassan v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 29750/09, 16 September 
2009, para. 100. 
76 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, U.N.T.S. vol. 115, 331.  
77 Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libya Arab Jamahriya/Chad), Judgment, International Court of Justice, 3 February 1994, 
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Further support for this approach to treaty interpretation may be found in the jurisprudence 
of the International Court of Justice. In the Reparations Advisory Opinion the Court was 
asked to determine whether the United Nations had the authority to bring an international 
claim. This authority was not explicitly established in the relevant treaty – the United 
Nations Charter – and so the court was required to determine whether an implicit 
authorisation existed. In answering this question in the affirmative the Court held that:  
 
Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those 
powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred 
upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its 
duties. This principle of law was applied by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice to the International Labour Organization […] and must be 
applied to the United Nations.81 
 
This approach to treaty interpretation – typically referred to as the ‘implied powers’ 
doctrine82 - is grounded in the principle of effectiveness. Recognition of the implied powers 
established under the UN Charter was necessary to give effect to States’ intentions, and to 
ensure the object and purpose of the Charter itself.83 
 
Returning to the issue of detention in non-international armed conflict, it is apparent that 
neither common article 3, nor article 5 Additional Protocol II, establish an explicit legal basis 
																																								 																				
81 Reparations for injuries suffered in the services of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, International Court of Justice, 11 April 
1949, 182. Emphasis added. 
82 See generally, Dr. Manuel Rama-Montaldo, International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International 
Organizations, 44 British Yearbook of International Law, 111 (1970). 
83 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, International Court of Justice, 8 July 1996, 
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for detention. However, it is equally apparent that they do not explicitly preclude such a 
legal basis. In order to resolve this issue and to establish whether an implicit legal basis 
exists, the law of treaty interpretation must be applied. Two factors relevant to this 
interpretation are recalled.84 First, it is unequivocal that States intended to regulate the 
occurrence of detention in non-international armed conflict, and that international 
humanitarian law obligations arising in this regard were intended to bind non-State armed 
groups.85 This clear intention to regulate detention operations carried out by State and non-
State armed groups may be said to constitute the ‘object and purpose’ of common article 3 
and article 5 Additional Protocol II. Second, it is unequivocal that in order for detention to 
be lawful it must conform to the prohibition of arbitrary detention: a legal basis for that 
detention must exist.  
 
Two possibilities are open: either international humanitarian law establishes an implicit 
legal basis for detention, or it does not and the authority to detain must be established 
elsewhere. If international humanitarian law does not establish an implicit legal basis for 
detention then all instances of detention by armed groups will necessarily violate the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention as a legal basis for armed group detention does not exist 
under domestic law or elsewhere in international law.86 Yet, to interpret common article 3 
and article 5 Additional Protocol II in this way is to conclude that States have developed 
international treaty law to regulate detention operations by armed groups, despite the fact 
																																								 																				
84 See above Section 1, subsections A and B. 
85 See for example the discussion relating to armed group capacity issues in relation to draft Article 8 (relating to detention) of 
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86 See above, Section 1, subsection B. 
that all instances of armed group detention are illegal.87 This interpretation is incapable of 
giving effect to States’ intentions, and to the object and purpose of the provisions 
themselves.88 As discussed above, States cannot regulate that which is absolutely 
prohibited,89 and so the only means by which common article 3 and article 5 can regulate 
detention by armed groups is if these provisions establish an implicit legal basis for that 
detention.  
 
Accordingly, an interpretation that international humanitarian law does not establish implicit 
detention authority must be regarded as invalid: ‘an interpretation that renders a text 
ineffective and meaningless is incorrect.’90 The law of treaty interpretation therefore requires 
that international humanitarian law be interpreted as establishing an implicit legal basis for 
detention. In light of the prohibition of arbitrary detention’s requirement that a legal basis 
exist, this is the only interpretation capable of giving effect to States’ intent to regulate 
detention operations carried out by both States and non-State armed groups in non-
international armed conflict. 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross supports the existence of implicit detention 
authority, although their underlying legal reasoning is not clearly expressed. In a November 
2014 Opinion on Internment in Armed Conflict the ICRC stated that: 
 
																																								 																				
87 In this situation the regulation of detention would be invalid as, absent a legal basis, the detention itself would be prohibited. 
See above Section 3. 
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89 See above Section 3. 
90 Maglosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties’ in Malcom D. Evans (ed.), International Law (OUP 2014, 
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both customary and treaty IHL contain an inherent power to intern and may in 
this respect be said to provide a legal basis for internment in NIAC. This 
position is based on the fact that internment is a form of deprivation of liberty 
which is a common occurrence in armed conflict, not prohibited by Common 
Article 3, and that Additional Protocol II – which has been ratified by 167 States 
– refers explicitly to internment.91 
 
To summarise, application of the law of treaty interpretation indicates that both common 
article 3 and article 5 Additional Protocol II must be interpreted as establishing an implicit 
legal basis for detention. In light of the prohibition of arbitrary detention and the application 
of these provisions to non-State armed groups it appears that no other interpretation is 
possible.  
 
6. Searching for a way forward  
 
The conclusion reached in Section 5 is consistent with current understandings of 
international law. This is not to suggest, however, that it is unproblematic, and objections 
from certain States may be anticipated. In order to determine a potential way forward three 
scenarios may be identified, the consequences of which must be explored: (a) the existence 
of an implied authority to detain, as established on the basis of the preceding argument, is 
rejected; (b) the existence of an implied authority to detain, as established on the basis of the 
																																								 																				
91 ‘Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules and Challenges’, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Opinion 
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preceding argument, is accepted; or (c) the prohibition of arbitrary detention is re-examined 
in light of its application to non-State armed groups, thereby altering the basis of the 
preceding argument, and raising the possibility that international law can regulate armed 
group detention without establishing implicit authority for that detention.  
 
In evaluating these scenarios, and charting a way forward, a number of factors are relevant. 
First is the need to ensure coherence within international law. Specifically, the rules of 
international law should apply consistently in relation to all international activity, in order 
to facilitate the application of the law. With respect to the issue at hand, for example, the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention should apply both during and outside armed conflict, and 
to States and non-State armed groups. If the application of this prohibition is modified in 
any way, the legal basis for this modification, and how it applies, should be clearly 
understood.92 In this regard, it is particularly important that the distinct status of non-State 
armed groups be recognised, and that the consequences of this status vis-à-vis the 
application of international law be understood and effectively incorporated into the 
international legal system. Issues relating to the coherence of international law are discussed 
further in Section A below. Second, the effectiveness of international humanitarian law must 
be maintained. This body of law provides much needed regulation and establishes much 
needed protection during armed conflict. Its effectiveness, and its ability to regulate armed 
groups party to a non-international armed conflict, must be ensured. Third, the primary role 
of States within the international system must be acknowledged. In this regard, States’ 
concerns at Geneva that the regulation of non-international armed conflict not unduly 
																																								 																				
92 The content of the obligation may need to be altered. For example, the prohibition of arbitrary detention may be interpreted 
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restrict the rights of States,93 not grant legitimacy to armed groups,94 and not constitute 
incitement to insurrection,95 must be accommodated. A key element in this regard was the 
right of States to punish insurgents in accordance with their domestic law.96 The three 
possible scenarios, or ways forward, will now be examined in turn. 
 
A. Rejecting the existence of implied detention authority 
 
The existence of implied detention authority, as established on the basis of the argument 
presented in Section 5, may be rejected. This approach ensures that States remain capable of 
criminalising detention by armed groups at the domestic level. However, the consequences 
of this approach on both the coherence of international law and the effectiveness of 
international humanitarian law are significant.  
 
When the application of international humanitarian law to armed groups is taken into 
consideration there does not appear to be a strong legal basis for rejecting the existence of 
implicit detention authority.97 A decision to reject such authority accordingly runs the risk of 
undermining the coherence of international law by treating the regulation of non-State 
armed groups in an ad hoc manner, isolated from the application of the broader system of 
international law. For example, rejecting the existence of implicit detention authority is only 
possible if the prohibition of arbitrary detention is ignored. Yet the continued application of 
																																								 																				
93 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. II Section B, France, 10. 
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97 See above Section 5. 
international human rights law during armed conflict is authoritatively accepted,98 and the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention is regarded as both non-derogable,99 and as forming part 
of the customary international law applicable to both States and armed groups.100 The 
rejection of implicit detention authority therefore requires a certain degree of legal 
exceptionalism in relation to the regulation of non-State armed groups. However, such 
exceptionalism renders the application of international law uncertain, frustrating the ability 
of the international legal system to effectively respond to the reality of armed group 
activities and posing problems for the application of international law more broadly. These 
problems are perfectly illustrated by the issue at hand. As demonstrated by the Serdar 
Mohammed case, the scope of activity permitted under international humanitarian law is 
uncertain – posing difficulties for both States and armed groups seeking to comply with the 
law – and the current debate on this issue neglects the application of international law to 
armed groups, undermining the unity of international law. For instance, rejecting the 
existence of implicit detention authority appears inconsistent with the international law of 
treaty interpretation, raising questions as to how this component of international law should 
be applied in relation to armed groups. 
 
Rejecting implicit detention authority also has potentially significant consequences with 
respect to the effectiveness of international humanitarian law, both at the level of affected 
individuals and more generally in relation to the utility and relevance of international 
humanitarian law itself. At the individual level, if international humanitarian law prohibits 
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all instances of detention by armed groups, the question arises as to what will happen to 
individuals who would otherwise be detained. The reality of armed conflict suggests that 
there is an increased risk that such individuals will be executed.101 Equally, if armed groups 
do in fact decide to detain, the underlying illegality of this detention means that 
international law cannot then regulate the conditions of detention and the treatment of 
detainees. This potentially increases the risk of torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. At a more general level, it is evident that detention forms a central component in 
the conduct of any armed campaign. If international humanitarian law regards detention by 
armed groups to be illegal, the relevance of international humanitarian law to armed groups 
must be questioned.102 This in turn risks undermining respect for international humanitarian 
law more broadly, with potential implications for fundamental rules such as the principle of 
distinction or the rules regulating the conduct of hostilities. 
 
B. Accepting the existence of implied detention authority 
 
The existence of an implied authority to detain may be accepted on the basis of the 
argument presented in Section 5 above. This approach both ensures the coherency of 
international law – it is based on a straightforward application of the international law of 
treaty interpretation and applies to both States and non-State armed groups – and ensures 
that international humanitarian law remains capable of effectively regulating the activity of 
armed groups party to a non-international armed conflict. It is suggested that this approach 
																																								 																				
101 For instance, in Mexico it was reported that vigilante groups detained suspected members of drug gangs and handed them 
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is the one most attuned to the current state of international law, and as such arguably has 
the strongest legal basis. However, it does give rise to a number of concerns. First, and 
perhaps foremost, is the impact on States’ ability to criminalise detention by armed groups 
at the domestic level. If implied detention authority is accepted, States cannot criminalise 
detention by armed groups, for instance on the basis of unlawful captivity or kidnapping, as 
a legal basis for detention exists under international law. Of course, States can still 
criminalise an individual’s involvement in armed group activity, perhaps on the basis of 
membership of an illegal organization or treason, and can still criminalise illegal detention 
by armed groups. However, accepting the legality of armed group detention may be 
perceived by States as limiting their ability to quell an insurrection and thus as unacceptable. 
Second, this approach does not acknowledge the distinct international status of armed 
groups, and the rules of international law are applied equally to State and non-State armed 
groups. As discussed in section C this may not be entirely appropriate.103 
 
C. Re-examining the prohibition of arbitrary detention in light of its application to 
non-State armed groups 
 
A third possibility also exists. The previous two scenarios, and the argument presented in 
Section 5, were based on the equal application of the prohibition of arbitrary detention to 
armed groups. Specifically, this prohibition was applied to States and armed groups in the 
same manner, with the content of the obligation unaltered. However, this may not be 
appropriate in light of the differences between these two entities. As discussed above, the 
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existence of a legal basis for detention forms part of the prohibition of arbitrary detention, 
but independently establishing that legal basis is impossible for the majority of armed 
groups party to a non-international armed conflict.104 This raises questions in relation to how 
the prohibition of arbitrary detention should be applied to armed groups, and whether the 
content of the prohibition should be altered to accommodate such groups’ lack of authority 
to make law, which arises as a result of their distinct status under international law.105  
 
In attempting to resolve this issue reference may be made to the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. In Hassan v. the United Kingdom the European Court was required to 
apply human rights law in relation to detention occurring in the context of an international 
armed conflict. In international armed conflict international humanitarian law establishes a 
legal basis for internment,106 but this is not permissible under the European Convention, 
absent derogation.107 In light of the appropriateness of international humanitarian law to the 
regulation of international armed conflict, the Court held that the European Convention 
should be interpreted as permitting the existence of detention authority.108 The content of the 
international human rights law obligation was thus significantly altered in light of the 
circumstances. Importantly, the Court held that any alteration to the content of a right must 
remain consistent with the ‘fundamental purpose’109 of the right in question. In relation to 
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internment, and the right to liberty and security, this required ensuring the protection of the 
individual from arbitrariness.110 
 
This approach may be applied to the issue at hand. As armed groups cannot independently 
establish a legal basis for their activity, the content of the prohibition of arbitrary detention, 
as applied to armed groups, could be altered to acknowledge this reality. In this regard it is 
respect for the fundamental purpose of the prohibition that is perhaps important, and not 
rigid application of the full content of the obligation, in a manner that treats armed groups 
as equivalent to States.111 As such it is the protection of the individual from arbitrariness that 
should be of principal concern, and not the requirement of a legal basis.112  
 
This suggestion is reinforced by reference to international case law which holds that, in 
determining whether detention is arbitrary, the existence of a legal basis is only one factor to 
be considered.113 In Saadi v. the United Kingdom the European Court held that ‘the notion of 
“arbitrariness” […] extends beyond lack of conformity with national law, so that a 
deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still arbitrary and thus 
contrary to the Convention.’114 Other factors relevant to a determination of arbitrariness 
identified by the Court include, inter alia, ‘an element of bad faith or deception on the part of 
the authorities’,115 whether detention conforms with the permissible grounds for detention 
established under international human rights law, and whether detention was necessary to 
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achieve the stated aim.116 Similarly, in Mukong v. Cameroon, the Human Rights Committee 
stated: 
 
The drafting history of article 9, paragraph 1, confirms that “arbitrariness” is 
not to be equated with “against the law”, but must be interpreted more broadly 
to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and 
due process of law.117 
 
It is suggested that a broader understanding of arbitrariness can be applied to instances of 
armed group detention in order to ensure conformity with the fundamental purpose of the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention, while acknowledging that armed groups cannot establish 
a legal basis. Armed groups necessarily remain bound by the prohibition of arbitrary 
detention, but the content of this obligation focuses on factors such as predictability, justice, 
appropriateness, and so on, and not on the existence of a legal basis. Significantly, if this 
understanding of the prohibition of arbitrary detention is applied to armed groups, 
international humanitarian law can regulate detention by armed groups without authorising 
that detention, as armed groups can conform with the prohibition of arbitrary detention, 
without the need to establish a legal basis for their detention operations. 
 
Conformity with this understanding of arbitrariness may be achieved through the 
promulgation of detention rules by the armed groups themselves. The development of 
internal rules and codes of conduct by armed groups occurs relatively routinely in 
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practice,118 and the elaboration of detention-related rules on this basis may be regarded as 
proximate to State’s establishment of a legal basis through domestic legislation, 
acknowledging the different legal status and authority of State and non-State entities. 
However, this is not an ideal solution for the simple reason that rules promulgated by 
different armed groups will inevitably be different. This may mean that the rules affecting 
an individual are somewhat arbitrary as they are dependent upon which armed group 
actually captures the individual, and not on a uniform standard. In the Serdar Mohammed 
case a similar problem was noted when States’ detention authority is established under 
domestic law but States operate in multinational operations.119 A better approach may be to 
develop standards at the international level. It is suggested that the grounds and procedures 
applicable to detention in non-international armed conflict can be derived from existing 
international law, in light of the object and purpose of international humanitarian law.120 
This task could be undertaken by an entity such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross,121 or through the development of international standards, perhaps by means of a UN 
General Assembly Declaration.122 The promulgation of standards at the international level 
would assist armed groups in conforming to the prohibition of arbitrary detention, and 
enable other actors – including individuals – to foresee when detention may occur and how 
it is regulated. 
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Adopting the approach presented in this scenario has a number of benefits. First, the 
coherence of international law is maintained. Instead of being regulated in an ad hoc manner 
– resulting in exceptionalism and uncertainty – armed groups are incorporated into a 
unitary international legal system. Although the content of the prohibition of arbitrary 
detention is slightly adapted in light of its application to armed groups, the application of 
the prohibition is consistently applied. This adaptation of content is a feature of international 
law, and occurs for example, in relation to the co-application of international human rights 
law and the law of armed conflict.123 Second, the effectiveness of international humanitarian 
law is maintained, as international humanitarian law can continue to regulate armed group 
detention, while remaining consistent with the requirements of international law more 
generally. This means that international humanitarian law remains relevant to armed 
groups, as they can conduct detention operations within the limits established by 
international law. Indeed, encouraging armed groups to promulgate detention rules, or to 
adhere to international rules developed specifically for armed groups, may have the effect of 
encouraging compliance more broadly. Finally, as international law does not authorise 
armed group detention (through the establishment of a legal basis), but instead regulates it 
should it occur,124 States can criminalise detention by armed groups at the domestic level. 
This may seem unfair from the perspective of armed groups. However, this is consistent 
with the current law of non-international armed conflict, as demonstrated by the fact that 
members of armed groups do not enjoy immunity from prosecution for legitimate acts of 
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war. Furthermore, it is perhaps unrealistic for armed groups to expect States to provide legal 
support for their efforts to overthrow the State.125 
 
Of the three scenarios, this approach is perhaps the most appropriate. It has the potential to 
ensure the coherent application of international law, to acknowledge the distinct status of 
armed groups, and to accommodate States desire to prosecute armed group activity.  
However, this approach will require further acceptance at the international level, and an 
acknowledgment that the content of obligations can be adapted in light of their application 
to armed groups. This adaptation is appropriate in light of the distinct status of armed 
groups, and is by no means a radical suggestion. In fact, it is entirely consistent with existing 
approaches to the context-dependent application of human rights law, for instance in 
relation to States’ extraterritorial human rights obligations,126 or the co-application of 
international human rights law and the law of armed conflict.127 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This article has analysed the existence of an implicit authority to detain in non-international 
armed conflict in light of international humanitarian law’s application to non-State armed 
groups. Applying the international law of treaty interpretation to the detention-related 
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provisions of international humanitarian law results in the conclusion that international 
humanitarian law must establish implicit detention authority. No other conclusion is 
capable of giving effect to the object and purpose of these provisions, namely the regulation 
of detention occurring in non-international armed conflict. This analysis is predicated on the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention, which requires that a legal basis for detention must exist, 
and the fact that international law cannot regulate a situation that is absolutely prohibited. 
 
In light of this conclusion three possible scenarios arise: (a) the existence of implicit 
detention authority may be rejected, (b) the existence of implicit detention authority may be 
accepted, or (c) the content of the prohibition of arbitrary detention may be reconsidered in 
light of its application to non-State armed groups, resulting in the possibility that 
international law can regulate detention without requiring that such detention be 
authorised. 
 
It is suggested that the straightforward rejection of implicit detention authority is 
inappropriate. As discussed above, this approach is inconsistent with current 
understandings of international law, and furthermore undermines both the coherence of 
international law and the effectiveness of international humanitarian law. 
 
Acceptance of implicit detention authority has the benefit of ensuring the coherence of 
international law and the effectiveness of international humanitarian law. This approach is 
based on a straightforward application of current international law. However, the existence 
of implied detention authority may be unpalatable to States as it will restrict their ability to 
criminalise armed group activity. If international law authorises detention in non-
international armed conflict, detention by armed groups cannot be criminalised at the 
domestic level. This approach also fails to fully acknowledge the distinct status of armed 
groups. Although it is unquestionably an improvement on the rejection approach, it does 
not adapt the content of armed groups’ obligations in light of the restrictions associated with 
their legal status. 
 
The third approach re-examines the content of the prohibition of arbitrary detention in light 
of its application to armed groups. It suggests that this prohibition cannot be applied to 
armed groups in exactly the same manner as States as a result of armed groups’ distinct 
legal status and the fact that they cannot establish a legal basis for their detention operations. 
Accordingly, the content of the obligation may be adapted such that ‘arbitrary’ is 
understood more broadly, in a manner consistent with the fundamental purposes of the 
prohibition, but without requiring a legal basis. This approach appears to present a number 
of clear benefits. It has the potential to ensure the coherent application of international law, 
to maintain the effectiveness of international humanitarian law, to acknowledge armed 
groups’ distinct status, and to facilitate States’ criminalisation of armed group activity. 
Furthermore, this approach may pave the way for the more effective integration of armed 
groups into the international legal system, and may facilitate the resolution of other issues 
that are likely to arise, such as those relating to the international human rights law 
prohibition of arbitrary killing and whether international humanitarian law establishes 
implicit authority to kill in non-international armed conflict.  
 
Irrespective of the approach taken, it is clear that international law must pay greater 
attention to the role of armed groups and how they are regulated. The international 
regulation of armed group activity should not be undertaken in an ad hoc manner, based on 
exceptionalism. Increased clarity is also required vis-à-vis the regulation of detention in non-
international armed conflict. The current lack of clarity means that States and armed groups 
seeking to comply with international law are not necessarily able to do so, as demonstrated 
by the Serdar Mohammed case in the United Kingdom. It is suggested that existing 
international law, taking note of the object and purpose of international humanitarian law, 
can be used to establish the required regulatory regime.128 Further work is clearly required in 
this regard, and is indeed necessitated by the international human rights law requirement 
that a detainee be able to effectively challenge the legal basis for their detention.129 
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